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Pipe dreams: eternal recurrence and simulacrum
in Foucault's ekphrasis of Magritte
GARY SHAPIRO

Michel Foucault invokes Andy Warhol at the conclusion
of This u Not a Pipe; this comes at the end of a chapter
entitled 'Seven Seals of Affirmation,' so that the words
must be read with a Nietzschean resonance (recalling
Zarathustra's 'The Seven Seals'):
A day will come when, by meam of similitude relayed
indefinitely along the length of a series, the 1mage itself,
along with the name it bears, will lose its identity. Campbell,
Campbell, Campbell, Campbell.'

I propose to explore the approach to the visual here which
proceeds by deploying or presupposing conceptions of
similitude, simulacrum, eternal recurrence and affirmation
that are variations on thoughts of Nietzsche and Gilles
Deleuze. In doing so I will read Foucault's essay on
Magritte as an instance of ekphrasis, that is as a verbal
text which aims at describing, simulating or evoking a
visual work of art. What will be unusual about this
variation on the ancient genre of d.-phrasis will be
Foucault's claim that Magritte's painting already speaks;
the consequence is a significant complication in the task
of the writer on art.
Foucault's reading of Magritte is by no means the
importation of philosophy into an alien context. Magritte's
art is from the start a form of seduction and provocation
directed towards philosophy. The painting and inscription
that find their way into Foucault's title seem to put into
question the very possibility of reference and the relationship between language and the world. Another painting,
Hegel's Holiday, depicting an open umbrella supporting a
glass of water, suggests perhaps that the philosopher is
above all interested in producing a shelter against alterity
and accident; even when on vacation he does not forget
his Regmschinn ('rain-shield,' more expressive here than
'urnbrella'). La philosophu dans boudmr echoes Sade's title;
its nightgown with breasts of flesh and its high-heeled
shoes with real toes also, like so much of Magritte's work,
pose an undecidable oscillation between the inside and
the outside, appearance and reality, the drapery or
covering and the naked truth presumed to underlie it. If
there are temptations to philosophy here, it is important
to note that they no longer include somr. of thr familiar
gestures toward a philosophy of the visual found in earlier
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painting. The issue of a reciprocity of gazes that arises in
Las Mmmas, where we are uncertain as to whether and
how the positions of model, painter and spectator intersect,
is not present. Nor does Magritte play with any of the
conventions of self-portraiture which explore the possibility
of man attaining self-knowledge. The image now is left on
its own.
Indeed, it is this tendency of the image to float free that
is implicit throughout the rhetoric of Foucault's essay. In
discussing the 1966 painting, Lts rkux mysthes, in which a
pipe drawn on a blackboard with the inscription 'Cm n'est
pas une pipe' is echoed, supplemented and contradicted by
the image of a larger pipe that seems suspended above it
in the air, he speaks of the latter as 'floating,' as a 'simple
notion or fantasy of a pipe,' and asks whether it is an
'emanation, a mist just detaching itself from the painting.' 3
This language might appear metaphorical or even whimsical, which it is; but it also stands in a rather rigorous
relation to the conception of the simulacrum developed
by Deleuze, and by that intermediary Foucault is putting
Magritte into dialog with a certain 'anti-Platonic' aspect
of Plato and with Lucretius' theory of perception. Deleuze
had written of Alice's Advmtures r.n Wonderland, proposing to
explain its paradoxical logic and texture by introducing
certain Stoic concepts of the event and the surface and
had spoken of 'the faint incorporeal mist that escapes from
bodies, a film without volume that envelops them. ' 4 (In
general, there is a strong parallel between Deleuze 's
reading of Lewis Carroll and Foucault's of Magritte: both
the writer and the painter emerge as artists of the surface
and the simulacrum.) This dialogue continues when
Foucault goes on to speak of a form that 'reascends to the
ethereal realm,' of similitudes being 'born of their own
vapor and ... ris[ing] endlessly into an ether where they
refer to nothing more than to themselves. ' 5
An appendix to Deleuze's Th Logu ef Sm.re, 'The
Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,' begins by asking
what it might mean to follow Friedrich Nietzsche's injunction to reverse Platonism. In going back to a neglected
theme in Plato himself and to Lucretius, something of an
outsider in relation to the canons of philosophy, Deleuze
proposes to excavate possibilities from within the philosophical tradition for valuing a certain multiplicity,
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possibilities that have been neglected by the hegemonic
form of the tradition itself. Deleuze focuses his efforts at
first on a reading of Plato's Sophist. In this dialogue an
important dIstinction between the legitimate icon or copy
on the one hand, and the wayward phantasm or simulacrum on the other, is illustrated by an analogy drawn from
the visual arts As Deleuze observes, 'the Platonic dialectic
is neither a dialectic of contradiction nor of contrariety,
but a dialectic of rIvalry (amphisbeUsis), a dialectic of rivals
and suitors.,I; The rivalry when vision is in question is not
only one between philosophy and its competitors but also
one that takes place among various forms of the visual.
There is a hierarchy of visual powers, productions and
forms of knowledge, including dreams, reflections, illusions, objects perceived in a variety of contexts and
perspectives, healthy and diseased eyes, and the eye of the
soul. In the Sophist the Stranger asks:
And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one
house by the art of building, and another by the art of
drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those
who are awake?'
In what might be called a strong reading of the dialogue,
Deleuze sees the SophLSt as releasing these dreams, as
Plato's thought is shaken by the possibility that there may
be no absolute model to which various images must
be referred:
.. it may be that the end of the Sophut contains the mo~t
extraordinary adventure of Platol1lsm: as a consequence of
searching in the direcllon of thc sunulacrum and of leaning
over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant,
that the simulacrum 15 not simply a false copy, but that it
places in question thc very notIOns of copy and model. B

It is this disturbance that creates an opening for the
Nietzschean project, for' "to reverse Platonism" means to
make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among
icons and copies.'9 And in a move that will echo (or be
simulated) in Foucault's essays on Deleuze and Magritte,
and in his remarks on Warhol, this rise of the simulacrum
is associated with the eternal recurrence and exemplified
by the phenomenon of Pop Art. Here the recurrence is
understood not as a way of orgamzing chaos hut as the
circulation of simulacra; in the eternal recurrence there is
no genuine or authentic model of which the infinitely
many recurrences or simulacra are copies. The recurrence
might be rethought as the reign of the simulacrum itself
and the expulsion of the Platonic model:
.. it does not make ronything come back. It is still selective,
it 'makes a difference,' but not at all in the manner of Plato.
What is selected are all the procedures opposed to selection;
what is excluded, what is made not to return, is that which
presupposes the Same and the Similar, that which pretends
to correct divergence, to recenter the circles or order the
chaos, and to provide a model or make a copy
70
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Modermty is said to be 'defined by the power of the
simulacrum' (in 1969, the date of Deleuze's work, there
was no talk of the postmodern). In this connection a
distinction is made between the artificial, which is in good
Platonic terms simply 'a copy of a copy,' and the simulacrum, for which that hlerarchy no longer obtains. That
which might appear at first as artificial can be transformed
or transvalued: 'The artificial is always a copy of a copy,
which should be pushed to /he pomt where It changes lis naturr
and is rrotmd mto 1M sltnuWrum (the moment of Pop Art)."o
If Warhol's images at first appear to be merely copies,
reproductions of well-known images of Coca-Cola bottles,
or of photographers' shots of Marilyn or Elvis, this marks
their status as artifice; but what appears as artificial from
a Platonic perspective can be 'reversed' by a mode of
presentation that makes it multiply and proliferate indefinitely so as to erase what would have been its sourel'
and center.
Foucault develops Deleuze's suggestions about the role
of the simulacrum in pop art in his essay 'Theatrum
Philosophicum,' which is devoted to a review of Deleuze's
Difference alld &petitum and The Logic qf Smse. Foucault sees
Andy Warhol's art as genuinely revelatory in a way that
complements his analysis of Magritte:
Thi~

is the greatness of Warhol with his cannt"o foods,
senseless aCCidents, and his series of advertising smiles: the
oral and nutritional eqUlvalence of those half-open lips,
teeth, tomato sauce, that hygiene based on detergents, tht"
equivalence of death in the cavity of an eviscerated car, at
the top of a telephone pole and at the end of a wire, and
between the glistemng, steel blue arms of the electric chair.
'It's the same either way,' stupidity 5ays, while smking into
itself and infinitely extending its nature WIth the thin~ it
says of itself; 'Here or there, it's always the same thing,
what difference if the colors vary, if they're darker or lighter.
It'5 all so senseless - life, women, death! How ridiculom
this stupidity!' But in concentrating on thiS boundle~s monotony, we find the sudden illumination of multiplicity itself WIth nothing at its center, at its highest point, or beyond it
- a flickering of light that travels even faster than the eyes
and successively lights up the moving label~ and the captive
snapshots that refer to each other to eternity, without ever
saying anything: suddenly, arising from the background of
the old inertia of equivalences, the 5triped form of the event
tean through the darkness, and the eternal phantasm
informs that soup can, that singular and depthless face."
I suggest that we understand the 'eternal phantasm' as the
simulacrum in its recurrence. Repeated infinitely, it liberates the image from its official or original meaning and
allows the emergence of a sheer multiplicity.
What neither Foucault nor Deleuze explicitly note in
their juxtaposition of Nietzsche's thought of the recurrr:nce
to a certain transformation of the visual image, is that this
association is already present in Zarathustra's most
extended speech on the recurrence, whose title already

indicates an optical theme: 'Vonz G~suht und Railzsd "0 What
recurs in the recurrence, let us recall, is the Augenblick,
usually translated somewhat blandly as the 'moment' but
it has the literal sense of a twinkling of the eye or the
interval of visual attentIOn between blinkings. Nietzsche
sets a specifically visual scene for Zarathustra's confrontation with the dwarf who embodies the spirit of gravity
here, describing a walk through 'the deadly pallor of
twilight' that leads to a gate that bears the Inscription
Augmhluk and at which two paths confront or abut one
another. At this gateway Zarathustra challenges the dwarf
to say what he sees and he replies dismiSSlvely (as 'stupidity'
responds to Warhol's multiples in Foucault's scenario):
'''All that IS straight lies," the dwarf murmured contemptuously. "All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle.'" The
dwarf voices a certain conception of the eternal recurrence,
one that assimilates it to the familiar figure of the circle.
He sees both more and less than Zarathustra sees. More,
because he claims that straight and divergent lines really
do circle around to meet. But this more is also less, less
because seeing the paths as circular eliminates the clash
and mutual offense that Zarathustra describes. And what
of the gateway itself, the site of the clash? The dwarf does
not describe it at all, perhaps he does not notice it. For
the evil eye that the dwarf embodies (and which is a
frequent theme in Nietzsche) everythmg is to be levelled
down: Zarathustra will fall, and each moment will simply
be submerged in the uniform figure of the circle, a figure
of perfect equality. The circle is inscribed, but dwarfvision overlooks the inscription as it overlooks everything
specific about the scene. Is not the inscription a doubling
and a deepening of this moment of vision, this gateway
that Zarathustra wants to see?
Zarathustra's question hcrc is 'Is seeing itself not
seeing abysses?' (1st Sehm nicht sethtr - Abgrundt sehm.~. To
see abysses is to become aware of the absence or failure
of the ground, not to pass lightly over the moment of
vision but to see it as a nzise-m-abilm. Sight requires courage
in such conditions, since we are constantly threatened by
vertigo when looking into an abyss. So Zarathustra asks,
in framing his story, 'Courage also destroys vertigo
(Scfu.vi.ndel) at abysses; and where does man not stand at
an abyss?' This is perhaps the courage of vision for which
Merleau-Ponty praises Cezanne, the refusal to put up with
facile solutions and the resolution to explore the complexity
of the visual.
Foucault seems to have taken up something of this
attitude into his generalized ~kphrasis of Warhol, when he
speaks of the 'eternal phantasm' or 'the striped form of
the event.' Mark Taylor has said that art like Warhol's
exhibits a style of thought that he calls 'logo centrism,'
that is a stress on the recognizable logo or label of the
celebrity, commodity, instantly recognizable symbol, or
scene that constitutes the occasion for a multiplication of

the image. '3 ""'hat Foucault wants to say about these
images, apparently produced to infinity, is that it is
precisely the form of their presentatlon, multiplication,
and indefinite proliferation that releases them from the
circle of the logo and precipitates an abyssal vision that
calls for a focus on the moment of vision, just as the
thought of eternal recurrence is meant to provoke an
attention to experiences that goes beyond fitting them into
one or another conventional narratives that we might tell
about our lives. This is what Foucault says about that
thought, just a few pages after the passage on Warhol:
As for the Return, must it be the perfect circle, the welJOIled millstone, which turns on its axiS and remtroduces
things, forms, and men at their appointed time? Must there
be a center and must events occur on its periphery?
perhaps like the young ~hepherd we must break this circular
ruse - like Zarathustra himself who bit off the head of the
serpent and immediately spat it away ... Aeon [the Stoic
contrast to Chronos, of which Deleuze writes 1 is UCUTTmce
itself, the straight lme of time, a splittmg quicker than
thought and narrower than any instant It causes the same
present to arise - on both sides of thiS indefimtely splitting
arrow - as always existing, as indefinitely present, and as
indefinite future '.

It is this conception of the recurrence that also contributes
to Foucault's analysis of the circulation of similitudes m
Magritte, and to his announcement that:
A day v{ill come when, by means of ~imilitude relayed
indefinitely along the length of a senes, the lIllage itself,
along with the name It bears, will lme its identity.

Foucault's last book before the Magritte essay, us mots et
its choses (the title poorly translated as Tht Ordtr qf Thmgs),
had also concluded with the apocalyptic pronouncement,
described again as an effacement or erasure, 'that one can
certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. "5 These two
vanishing acts are intimately connected in so far as it is
the same factors that will destabilize the reign of man and
that of the representational image. Let us look more
carefully now at the argument of This is Not a Pipe with
these erasures in mind.
At the beginning of Foucault's bravura ekphrases of the
two versions of the painting that include those words, he
wants to insist that the genre presupposed by what we are
beholding is not the painting or picture in general, but
the calligram. Especially the second painting, the one with
two pipes (or their images, their simulacra) must be
understood as based on a fusion of the visual and the
linguistic, the imaged and the written: 'The operation is
a calligram that Magritte has secretly constructed, then
carefully unraveled . .,6 From the outset, then, Foucault's
essay will have complicated the traditions and conventions
of the rkphraru, just as Magritte's painting will have
7
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deformed some of the conventions and traditions of the
Western pictorial mode since the Renaissance. For the
~kphra.fl5 ordinarily supposes that the writer (possibly a
poet, critic, or philosopher) makes a painting speak; the
account that he or she provides gives a voice to that which
is silent (as Andre Malraux, for example, becomes a
ventriloquist for Th VoiGtS of Szlence). But if what is to be
described alrwl{y speaks, indeed if it seems to speak of
itself, then the writer is not bringing a voice to the
voiceless, but entering into a conversation already begun.
In the calligram, words and letters are arranged so as to
suggei>t forms that evoke objects or themes that are
themselves topics of or commentaries on their text.
Eventually Foucault will suggest that Magritte's pipe paintings are responses to one of Apollinaire's calligrams,
'Fumees,' that itself orders some of its words into the
shape of a pipe. The calligram then challenges the very
conditions that make the ~kphrasis possible:
The calhgram use~ that capacity of letters to signify both as
linear clcmcn~ that can be arranged in ~pace dud as signs
that romt unroll accordmg to a unique chain of sound. As a
sign, the letter permits us to fix word~; as lme, lt lets us give
shape to things. Thm the calligram ~pire~ playfully to efface
the olde~t oppmitioru of our alphabetical civilizauon: to
show and to name; to shape and to say; to reproduce and to
articulate; to imitate and to signify; to look and to read. '7

Let us recall that Zarathustra's discourse on the abyss
involved in all seeing is also based on a vision which, if
not precisely a calligram, also mixes inscription and image.
The problem of naming or inscribing the moment, which
is graphically presmted by the word Augmbluk on the
gateway, is a disruption of the topoz of reference, indexicality, and temporality in Western thought. Already an
ingredient in Heraclitus' sayings is the impossibility of
holding fast the passing moment, a theme that received a
magisterial treatment from Augustine, who insisted on the
impossibility of naming the present, which must immediately escape before its name is pronounced. Hegel, at the
beginning of the Phmamenolog:y of Spznt, proposes that one
who believes in the fullness and cognitive certainty of the
moment ought to try the experiment of writing down or
describing that realization; experience will teach that 'now
it is night' or 'now it is day' will be quickly falsified by the
passage of time. The inscription on Zarathustra's gateway
offers an affront to these philosophies, by writing the name
of the moment, Augmblick, in stone. The dwarf produces
a variant of the standard philosophical response to the
problematic by insisting on the movement or flow of time
and neglecting the inscription of the moment, its intensity
or haecceiJa..s.
Lessing attempted to justify and codify the distinction
between the plastic and the verbal modes of art in his
Laocoon. The former is attached to the privileged or frozen
moment, the latter can be dramatic and narrative; from
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this perspective it is a mistake to tell a story with a picture
or to paint with words. Homer is right not to describe
Helen's appearance but to let us know the effect it has on
the Trojan elders. All of this is broken down in Nietzsche,
Foucault and Magritte. The paradox of Magritte's inscription, like Zarathustra's, is that It subverts the function of
the 'legend,' that which is to be read:
... Magntte seemingly returns to the simple correspondence
of the unage with its legend. Without saying anythmg, a
mute and adequately recognizable figure dISplays the object
in its essence; from the unage, a name written below receives
i~ 'meaning' or rule for usage. Now, compared to the
traditional function of the legend, Magntte's text is doubly
paradoxical. It sets out to name wmething that evidently
doe~ not need to be named (the form is too well known, the
label too familiar). And at the moment when he should
reveal the name, MagTitte does so by denymg that the
object IS what it is. 'U

In Foucault's ekphrasis of Les drux "!ystem, a complicated
story is told that involves a variety of actions, voices, and
events. The 'pipe on the blackboard,' accompanied by the
words' Ceci n'est pas um pzpe' written in an all too schoolmasterly hand, i, taken to be part of a classroom demonstration. In this case the lesson being taught is an essential
step in philosophy: do not confuse images and things. The
picture of a pipe, for all its resemblance to the real thing,
is certainly not smokable or even tangible. Foucault's
PTOSOPOPeia. puts this lesson in the mouth of a pedagogue,
so that the whole scene of instruction becomes animated
by his interchange with his students. As soon as the teacher
speaks, he is compelled by the lesson that he would teach
to criticize what he has just said:
But why have we introduced the teacher's voice? Because
scarcely h~ he stated, 'Thl~ ~ a pipe,' before he mmt
correct himself and stutter, 'This is not a pipe, but a drawing
of a pipe,' 'This ~ not a pipe but a ~entence saying that
thiS IS not a pipe,' 'The ~entence "thi~ is not a pipe" ~ not
a pipe,' 'In the sentence "this IS not a pipe" t.Ius is not a
pipe: the painting, written sentence, drawing of a pipe - all
this IS not a pipe.'

At least since Plato's Cra!Jlus philosophy has been trying
to teach the lesson that one ought not to assimilate words
and things, that the order of language must not be
confounded with that of the world. And yet as soon as the
philosopher speaks, even if the lesson is well taken, questions can arise about that speech itself: the problems that
were expelled from the object language may surface in
the meta-language. Of course the regress can be brought
to a halt by invoking something like Russell's theory of
types, so that rigorous distinctions can be enforced between
the various levels of language. But this break may seem
abrupt and artificial; if the status of the meta-language is
left open, the conscientious philosopher may have worries
like the teacher in Foucault's scenario.

In all of this concern for preclSlon in speech and the
avoidance of error, there is a certain obsession with that
which is excluded. We might say that the progressive
attempt5 to evade the false identification of words, images,
paintings, indexical signs, and inscriptions with their
objects or referents are haunted by the specter that they
seek to exorcise. And this is the very scene that Foucault
sees Magritte as enacting for us:
Negations multiply themselves, the voice is confmed and
choked. The baffled master lowers his extended pointer,
turns his back to the board, regards the uproarious studentl!,
and does not realize that they laugh so loudly because above
the blackboard and h~ stammered den!a.ls, a vapor has just
risen, little by little taking shape and now creating, precisely
and without a doubt, a pipe. 'A pipe, a pipe,' cry the
students, stamping away while the teacher, hiS voice smkmg
ever lower, murmun always with the same obstinacy though
no one is listening, 'And yet it is not a pipe.' He is not
mistaken ... 'q

And yet he is not completely right either, for what he fails
to acknowledge is the 'vapor,' the floating image or simulacrum that complicates his negations and distinctions. The
pedagogical scene constructed here (is it Magritte's or
Foucault's?) pertains not only to philosophy's concern with
language and reference, but to the way in which painting
has been constituted. The anecdote told of Zeuxis and
Parrhasius is paradigmatic: the first painted grapes so
realistic that birds tried to eat them; the latter presented
him with a draped painting that was to be the rival of that
one, but the drapery in fact was the painting, and when
Zeuxis asked for it to be unveiled, he had to confess that
Parrhasius was the superior painter. Painting has had to
flirt with the possibility of producing an illusion of the real
or a substitute for it, while at the same time preserving a
distance from it (as in the ironic distance of the master of
the tromp~-lJotil). It is this entire history that is condensed,
dramatized, and transformed in Foucault's mm-m-sctru.
In Magritte, says Foucault, we have 'An art of the
"Same," liberated from the "as if." We are farthest from
tTOmp~-l'otil. " 0 In the longest chapter of his essay 'Seven
Seals of Affirmation,' he brings together a Nietzschean
conception of recurrence and affirmation with Deleuze's
notion of the simulacrum. Everything hinges on the distinction between resemblance and similitude:
Resemblance has a 'model,' an original element that orders
and hlerarchizes the mcrea"ingly less faithful copies that
can be struck from it. Resemblance presupposes a primary
reference that prescribes and classifies. The similar develops
in series that have neither beginning nor end, that can be
followed in one direction a" ea"ily a" in another, that obey
no hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small dIfferences, among small differences."

It is important to note that Foucault is no longer using
the term 'resemblance' in the same way that he did in Us

mots et Us chos~. There, resemblance and similitude were
both modes of the analogical thinkmg of the Renaissance,
in which the world is seen as a great web of corresponding
parts and aspects, linking texts and thmgs and microcosm
and macrocosm. Magritte wrote to Foucault after the
publication of the earlier book, urging a distinction
between resemblance and similitude, according to which
things may or may not have relations of similitude with
one another (green peas being hiS example of such things)
but 'Only thought resembles. It resembles by being what
it sees, hears, or knows; it becomes what the world offers
It. ". Magritte seems to be concerned to formulate a
general distinction between two relations here and does
not attend to the archaeologically specific context of
Foucault's discussion of the way in which premodern
knowledge was organized. In ThIS is Not a Pip~ the philosopher uses 'resemblance' to designate a relationship of
copying, in which a picture, for example, resembles its
original by both referring to it and by looking like it.
Similitude, on the other hand, has become strictly a
relation among images without any reference to an
external model or a primary instance.'3
The difference between resemblance and similitude
could be described in economic terms as a distinction
between appropriation and circulation. Resemblance
refers back to an original, to which it belongs and to
which it remains subordinate. Similitude is a continuous
movement that 'circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite
and reversible relation of the similar to the similar.' What
has been erased in similitude is any trace of monarchy or
sovereignty; when Foucault says that the latter notions
have no place in Magritte, there is surely an echo of the
essay on Las Mmmas, in which the position of the sovereign
and the claims of representalion are intimately bound
together. In discussing the ironically titled Repmmtatwn
Foucault notes how a smaller part of the painting, framed
by a balustrade, repeats precisely the scene of the larger
painting. The title and the miu-m-abim~ structure make
this work into a tableau of representation or visual presentation itself (representation here is reduced to the
presentation of similitude), analogous to the function that
Velazquez's painting has with respect to the classical
episteme. Foucault remarks that the two images in their
similitude are sufficient to generate an infinite series, and
consequently to abolish any sovereign or monarchical
principle:
Even as the exactness of the image functioned as a finger
pointing to a model, to a sovereign, unique and exterior
'pattern,' the series of Similitudes (and two are enough to
establish a series) abolishes this simultaneously real and
ideal monarchy.'~

And he asks 'Is it not the role of resemblance to be the
sovereign that makes things appear?"5

73

\A/e can now begIn to see that there is an analogy
between more overtly political regimes of vision and the
forms taken by visual art. In the age of sovereignty, as
Foucault emphasized in Dtsclplll1.t and Punish, it is the
sovereign, his proxy, or the effects of his power which are
put on display; this is also the grand age of the portrait,
first of royal or aristocratic personages, second, and by
approximation, of the successful bourgeoisie. In Las
Mminas, as described by most commentators (and Foucault
does not exclude this interpretation), the painter and some
of the other figures depicted seem to have paused in their
activities to give their attention to the king and queen
who have just entered the room. They, or their images
on the canvas (and we need not decide between these two
possibilities) are reflected in the mirror at the back of the
room (and that framed image may even be the painting
of a mirror,5); the painting as a whole embodies the
aesthetics of sovereignty both in its commitment to resemblance and in its presentation of the panorama of royal
power - king and queen, princess, attendants and
Velazquez himself who is both an artist of resemblance
and an ambitious courtier whose painting has plausibly
been read as an attempt to provide a royal legitimization
for the art of painting as well as to certify his own position
at court.'7
According to Foucault, sovereignty has been replaced
in the carceral society by a structure of power in which
there is no central figure on display. There is a uniformity
enforced by the architectures, regulations, and protocols
of power which circulate without end; the gaze has been
mobilized and is no longer exclusively exercised by or
directed at anyone person. The art of similitude proceeds
by means of an analogous circulation of images that have
been cut loose from any original. Power, as Foucault likes
to insist, is productive and not merely repressive (as the
theories based on sovereignty declare); this principle has
consequences at several levels. If panoptic machinery
produces delinquencies, docile bodies and perversions,
the art of circulating similitudes has the power to
eviscerate the supposed original meaning of the image
and to force upon us the sense of an indefinite repetition.
In this mode of repetition and the simulacrum, 'Similitude
multiplies different affirmations, which dance together,
tilting and tumbling over one another. ,,8 The echo of
the rhetoric of dancing and affirmation from the descriptions of the eternal recurrence in Zarathustra seems more
than accidental (see the chapters 'The Convalescent,'
'The Other Dancing Song,' and 'The Seven Seals [or
The Yes and Amen Song'). It is in this spirit that Foucault
explains how the drawing that resembles a pipe and
the text that resembles a text subvert their own resemblance in order to generate 'an open network of
similitudes' in which explicit negations are transvalued
into affirmations:
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Each element of 'thiS is not a pipe' could hold an apparently
negative discourse - because it denies, along with resemblance, the asserUon of reality re5emblance conveys - but
one that i~ basically affirmative: the affirmation of the
Simulacrum, affirmatIOn of the element within the network
of the slmilar."4

Foucault then proposes to 'establish the series of these
affirmations,' by exploring the different voices that speak
in 'thi~ is not a pipe.' Affirmation is always multiple
because it is beyond limit and restriction. Nietzsche had
asked 'Now that God is dead, who IS speaking?', suggesting
that with the disappearance of the sovereign center there
is no longer an authoritative subject to ground texts or
utterances (as in the higher criticism of the Bible or the
Homeric question that are paradigmatic for his own work
as a philologist). In the wake of the decline of resemblance,
which is linked to the fate of sovereignty, Foucault asks of
Magritte's painting 'Who speaks in the statement?' and
proceeds to detail seven speakers: the lower pipe, the
higher pipe, the inscription, the texl and the lower pipe
in unison, the two pipes speaking together, the text and
the higher pipe, and a 'dislocated voice' that speaks of all
the pamting's elements. If the lower pipe inSISts that it is
only a drawing, this insistence is echoed and amplified by
the higher one which acknowledges itself to be a 'cloudy
similitude, referring to nothing,' and the other voices add
their own variations, 'tilting and tumbling over one
another.' In 'The Seven Seals' of Nietzsche's ;:,arathustra,
the speaker disperses himself into various voices and
functions (e.g. 'If I am fond of the sea ... ,' 'If my virtue
is a dancer's virtue ... ,' 'If ever I spread tranquil skies
over myself ... '). What all the voices affirm, in chorus, is
the eternal recurrence, the infinite depth of the moment
that is experienced as repeated without limit. The momentof-vision or twinkling of the eye (Augmblick) is no longer a
mere appearance to be grounded upon or to refer to
a more substantial reality; it has acquired its own depth.
This is analogous to what happens to similitude among
the seven affirmations - 'seven discourses in a single
statement' - that issue from Magritte's painting:
Henceforth sirmlitude l..S restored to Jt5elf - unfolding from
itself and folding back upon Itself. It is no longer the finger
pointing out from the canva.5 in order to refer to something
else. It inaugurate5 a play of transferences that run, proliferate, propagate, and correspond withm the layout of the
painting, affirming and repre5enting nothmg. 30

Let us be careful about this 'affirming and representing
nothing.' It is not that there is no affirmation, Foucault
seems to be saying here, but that nothing !S affirmed. It is
the affirmation of similitude as sheer image, emptied of
meaning and reference. In 'Theatrum Philosophicum'
Foucault had spoken of'the sudden illumination ofmultiplicity itself - with nothing at its center, at its highest point,

or beyond it.' Foucault might seem to teeter here on the
brink of nihilIsm, recalling Nietzsche's principle that 'man
would rather will nothingness than 110/ will.'3' The disappearance of the center could be taken as a cause for
lamentation or as the impetus for a series of desperate
efforts to substitute another version of the center for the
one that has been lost. Or it might be celebrated as it is
here in the form of a dance of sImilitude. Characteristically,
Foucault speaks in the passage quoted above of the fold
(Pli) of similitude, 'unfolding from itself and folding back
upon itself.' The notion of the fold is somewhat elusive,
but it ~eems to designate what happens when resistance
becomes itself a structure of power; it is not interiority in
the classical sense of subjectivity, but the inside of the
outside, a doubling. As Deleuze suggests, Foucault's late
analysis of thc Greeks outlines a form of doubling in which
one gains mastery over oneself; the UJ~ of pleasurc is not to
be driven by It, but to take it as an occasion for selfregulation.)' Magritte's or Warhol's folding of simihtude
means that images are no longer simply the product of
external forces to which they refer or which cause them,
but that they exhibit themselves as images, achieving a
relaLive independence from what is outside. Foucault makes
some analogous observations about the photography of
Duane Michals in an introduction to a book of his work:
For Duane Michals, grasping reality, captunng movement,
taking from life, mducing to see ... are the traps of
photography: a fah~ compul~ion, a clum~y desire, having
illusiom about yourself.
For a long time the photographer's gaze has monopolized the practice of photography
and impos~d It5 own law
The fold practiced or embodied by Michals is that he
'undertakes to cancel out what one might call the ocular
function of photography' by means of 'a whole series of
more or less complex games in which the lens constantly
allows the visible to escape it.' These consist in such
strategies as photographing the evanescent, the ghostly or
the invisible; or in complicating the visual by adding
written inscriptions or painting over part of the photograph. 33 The cancelling of the ocular, like the avoidance
of resemblance, is the folding of an an. Foucault's short
essay on Michals appeared in 1982, just two years after
Roland Barthes' Gamaa LucuJa, which also asks the question
whether photography can be an art, but which holds to
the principle that a photograph is necessarily the record
or trace of an actual event or stimulus (the exposure of
the film) and never confronts the possibility that the
photographic work could be folded in on itself.
In praising Magritte, Warhol, or Michals, Foucault
appears to embrace Zarathustra's dictum that 'all vision
is seeing abysses,' summoning up a world in which the
identity of the image disappears in a vertigo of repetitions,
along with the figure of man who would have served as

the stabilizing center of the ~i&o. The 'I see' seems to
have gone the way of the 'I think' (the cogl/o). But we may
still wonder whether some trace or shadow of the viewer
remains here and, if so, what that observer looks like in
turn. Notoriously, Foucault thematized his efforts to evade
identification in the form of a brief dialogue at the close
of the introduction to 77z~ Archaeology of Knowltdgt. Here
the unnamed and disembodied voice of the writer speaks
of preparing a labyrinth for himself, one:
. in whIch I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes
that I WIll never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the
only one who writes m order to have no face. Do not ask
who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it
to our bureaucrats and our pohce to see that our papers
are m order. At least spare us their morality when we wntc.3-I

And when w~ look is implied by the visual figures here,
which conjure up the image of the voyeur, who sees from
the depths of his labyrinth, appears only fleetingly to eyes
that will never reinspect him and who manages to shed
his face. But Nietzsche, who preceded Foucault with a
rhetoric of the labyrinth and the mask, did not always
imagine that such an escape from the gaze could be
effected, for he issued this cautionary note: 'when you
look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you. '35
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